



**PALADIN**  
BLOCKCHAIN SECURITY

# Smart Contract Security Assessment

Final Report

For Digits DAO

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# 1 Overview

This report has been prepared for Digits DAO on the Avalanche network. Paladin provides a user-centred examination of the smart contracts to look for vulnerabilities, logic errors or other issues from both an internal and external perspective.

## 1.1 Summary

<b>Project Name</b>	Digits DAO
<b>URL</b>	<a href="https://digitsdao.finance/">https://digitsdao.finance/</a>
<b>Platform</b>	Avalanche
<b>Language</b>	Solidity

## 1.2 Contracts Assessed

Name	Contract	Live Code Match
Digits	0x18e2269f98db2eda3cfc06e6cca384b291e553d9	✓ MATCH
TokenStorage	0x94de014e5b5221a9e1b7c02518463074a79dde6a	✓ MATCH
DividendTracker	0x6d39663ec3b905c019642e75fe674fc67384e58e	✓ MATCH

## 1.3 Findings Summary

Severity	Found	Resolved	Partially Resolved	Acknowledged (no change made)
● High	7	7	-	-
● Medium	6	5	-	1
● Low	2	2	-	-
● Informational	15	15	-	-
<b>Total</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>1</b>

### Classification of Issues

Severity	Description
● High	Exploits, vulnerabilities or errors that will certainly or probabilistically lead towards loss of funds, control, or impairment of the contract and its functions. Issues under this classification are recommended to be fixed with utmost urgency.
● Medium	Bugs or issues that may be subject to exploit, though their impact is somewhat limited. Issues under this classification are recommended to be fixed as soon as possible.
● Low	Effects are minimal in isolation and do not pose a significant danger to the project or its users. Issues under this classification are recommended to be fixed nonetheless.
● Informational	Consistency, syntax or style best practices. Generally pose a negligible level of risk, if any.

## 1.3.1 Digits

ID	Severity	Summary	Status
01	HIGH	Gov Privilege: Token owner can drain all DAI dividends	RESOLVED
02	HIGH	Gov Privilege: setTokenStorage could be used to revert transactions, siphon fees or turn the token into a honeypot	RESOLVED
03	HIGH	Gov Privilege: updateUniswapV2Router could be used to revert transactions, siphon fees or turn the token into a honeypot	RESOLVED
04	HIGH	Gov Privilege: Fees are freely adjustable up to over 100%	RESOLVED
05	HIGH	Gov Privilege: Owner can blacklist wallets	RESOLVED
06	HIGH	uniswapRouter is initially set to an invalid address	RESOLVED
07	MEDIUM	Gov Privilege: Setting the liquidity wallet to the zero address turns the token into a honeypot	RESOLVED
08	MEDIUM	Gov Privilege: All tokens are pre-minted to the contract owner	RESOLVED
09	MEDIUM	DEAD address are not excluded from dividends	RESOLVED
10	LOW	automatedMarketMakerPairs may get out of sync with uniswapV2Pair	RESOLVED
11	LOW	maxTxBPS is initially set below the minimum enforced value	RESOLVED
12	INFO	Unnecessary zero address checks in _executeTransfer	RESOLVED
13	INFO	A number of variables are unused	RESOLVED
14	INFO	dividendTracker should be made immutable	RESOLVED
15	INFO	_name, _symbol, dai and uniswapRouter can be made constant	RESOLVED
16	INFO	A number of variables can be made external	RESOLVED
17	INFO	Lack of events for functions that change sensitive variables	RESOLVED
18	INFO	A number of return values are not handled	RESOLVED

## 1.3.2 TokenStorage

ID	Severity	Summary	Status
19	HIGH	Gov Privilege: Owner can add any address as an authorized manager to withdraw funds or turn the Digits token into a honeypot	RESOLVED
20	MEDIUM	Gov Privilege: Owner can update token address, turning the Digits token into a honeypot	RESOLVED
21	MEDIUM	LP tokens from addLiquidity are sent to liquidityWallet	ACKNOWLEDGED
22	MEDIUM	setLiquidityWallet and updateUniswapV2Router lack zero address checks	RESOLVED
23	INFO	success is unused in distributeDividends	RESOLVED
24	INFO	dividendTracker should be made immutable	RESOLVED
25	INFO	dai can be made constant	RESOLVED
26	INFO	A number of variables can be made external	RESOLVED

## 1.3.3 DividendTracker

ID	Severity	Summary	Status
27	INFO	Ambiguous error in distributeDividends	RESOLVED
28	INFO	tokenAddress should be made immutable	RESOLVED
29	INFO	dai, _name and _symbol can be made constant	RESOLVED
30	INFO	A number of variables can be made external	RESOLVED

# 2 Findings

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## 2.1 Digits

Digits (DIGITS) is a dividend distributing token that has fees on transfer. Aside from allowing users to claim dividends (distributed as DAI tokens), it also allows them to compound these dividends into further Digits tokens.

For each non-whitelisted transfer, a fee of 12% is enforced: 3% reflection to dividends, 2% for liquidity and 7% for marketing. The fee percentages can be changed by the token owner, up to a maximum of 24% total.

These fees are transferred to a TokenStorage contract, and whenever the balance reaches a certain threshold (initially 100,000 Digits tokens), they will be swapped on SushiSwap for DAI and the dividends portion transferred to a DividendTracker contract, ready for distribution.

### 2.1.1 Token Overview

<b>Address</b>	0x18e2269f98db2eda3cfc06e6cca384b291e553d9
<b>Token Supply</b>	1,000,000,000
<b>Decimal Places</b>	18
<b>Transfer Max Size</b>	0.49% of the total supply
<b>Transfer Min Size</b>	None
<b>Max Wallet Size</b>	2% of the total supply
<b>Transfer Fees</b>	12%, can be set to a maximum of 24%
<b>Pre-mints</b>	1,000,000,000

## 2.1.2 Privileges

The following functions can be called by the owner of the contract:

- `renounceOwnership`
- `transferOwnership`
- `openTrading`
- `excludeFromFees`
- `excludeFromDividends`
- `setWallet`
- `setAutomatedMarketMakerPair`
- `setFee`
- `setSwapEnabled`
- `setTaxEnabled`
- `setCompoundingEnabled`
- `updateDividendSettings`
- `setMaxTxBPS`
- `excludeFromMaxTx`
- `setMaxWalletBPS`
- `excludeFromMaxWallet`



## 2.1.3 Issues & Recommendations

<b>Issue #01</b>	<b>Gov Privilege: Token owner can drain all DAI dividends</b>
<b>Severity</b>	 HIGH SEVERITY
<b>Description</b>	The token owner can call <code>manualSendDividend</code> on the token contract to transfer any or all of the DAI dividends accumulated on the <code>DividendTracker</code> to any address. Users would then be unable to claim their dividends.
<b>Recommendation</b>	Consider removing this function. If the intent is to be able to withdraw any <u>excess</u> DAI accumulated on the <code>DividendTracker</code> , then consider modifying the function to ensure enough DAI remains for all users to be able to claim their dividends.
<b>Resolution</b>	 RESOLVED This function has been removed.
<b>Issue #02</b>	<b>Gov Privilege: <code>setTokenStorage</code> could be used to revert transactions, siphon fees or turn the token into a honeypot</b>
<b>Severity</b>	 HIGH SEVERITY
<b>Description</b>	The owner can change the <code>TokenStorage</code> contract used to store transfer fees, even after it has initially been set (including to the zero address). This contract could be a malicious contract that simply keeps the tokens sent to it and thus siphons all the fees. Additionally, this contract could be used to revert sell transactions turning the token into a honeypot.
<b>Recommendation</b>	Consider removing this function and then creating the <code>TokenStorage</code> contract immutably in the constructor. If it is still desirable to keep the function, then consider only allowing <code>tokenStorage</code> to be initialized once, and disallowing subsequent updates. Also consider requiring the <code>tokenStorage</code> address to be non-zero when it is set.
<b>Resolution</b>	 RESOLVED This function can only be called once to initialize the <code>TokenStorage</code> contract.

**Issue #03****Gov Privilege: updateUniswapV2Router could be used to revert transactions, siphon fees or turn the token into a honeypot****Severity** HIGH SEVERITY**Description**

The owner can update the router that generates liquidity to an address or contract of choice (including the zero address). This contract could be a malicious contract that simply keeps the tokens sent to it and thus siphons all the fees. Additionally, this contract could be used to revert sell transactions turning the token into a honeypot.

**Recommendation**

Consider removing this function.

If this is not possible, consider using an Owner account that is behind a significantly long timelock so investors can reasonably see this change coming and inspect the new router. Also consider requiring the router address to be non-zero.

**Resolution** RESOLVED

This function has been removed.

**Issue #04****Gov Privilege: Fees are freely adjustable up to over 100%****Severity** HIGH SEVERITY**Description**

The owner of the contract can set the individual fees to any variable. This might deter investors as they could be wary that these fees might one day be set to 100% to force transfers to go to the contract owner.

**Recommendation**

Consider adding an explicit cap to the total fee on every fee adjustment function.

**Resolution** RESOLVED

Each tax component can be no more than 8%, giving a total maximum cap of 24%.

**Issue #05****Gov Privilege: Owner can blacklist wallets****Severity** HIGH SEVERITY**Description**

Currently, the owner can blacklist wallets from purchasing or selling the tokens they hold. This might deter investors from purchasing the token.

**Recommendation**

Consider either removing the blacklist functionality, or only allowing it to be called for a certain duration after liquidity has been added. Alternatively, consider putting the token behind a significantly long timelock so investors can see any change coming.

**Resolution** RESOLVED

This functionality has been removed.

**Issue #06****uniswapRouter is initially set to an invalid address****Severity** HIGH SEVERITY**Location**

Line 27  
address public uniswapRouter =  
address(0x7a250d5630B4cF539739dF2C5dAcB4c659F2488D); // sushi  
router

**Description**

The address `uniswapRouter` is initially set to is just a user wallet on the Avalanche chain, and does not correspond to the comment of it being the SushiSwap router. As this will cause an error when used in the constructor, it is unlikely this contract will be deployable on mainnet.

**Recommendation**

Consider setting the initial value of `uniswapRouter` to a valid router address.

**Resolution** RESOLVED

The address has been updated to the correct SushiSwap router address.

**Issue #07****Gov Privilege: Setting the liquidity wallet to the zero address turns the token into a honeypot****Severity** MEDIUM SEVERITY**Description**

The owner can set the liquidity wallet address to zero, however, liquidity cannot be added to the zero address. Thus, if the governance ever sets the liquidity wallet to the zero address, they would effectively block all sell transactions, turning the token into a honeypot since `_executeSwap` is not called on purchases.

**Recommendation**

Consider requiring the liquidity wallet to be non-zero in both the constructor and `setWallet`.

```
require(_liquidityWallet != address(0), "zero!");
```

**Resolution** RESOLVED**Issue #08****Gov Privilege: All tokens are pre-minted to the contract owner****Severity** MEDIUM SEVERITY**Description**

The contract owner may have many legitimate uses for the pre-minted tokens including, but not limited to, the injection of initial liquidity, token presale, or airdrops; however, they may also use these pre-minted tokens for dumping after adding liquidity.

**Recommendation**

Consider being forthright by letting your community know how much was minted, where they are currently stored, if a vesting contract was used for token unlocking, and finally the purpose of any remaining held tokens.

**Resolution** RESOLVED

The project has documented to its users the total supply and how it will be distributed: 15% to the team, 10% to treasury, 75% as liquidity (which will be locked with RugDoc).

**Issue #09****DEAD address is not excluded from dividends****Severity** MEDIUM SEVERITY**Description**

The DEAD address is not excluded from dividends, so any burned tokens will still be sharing dividends, which will accumulate on the DividendTracker. These can then be withdrawn by the contract owner via `manualSendDividend`.

**Recommendation**

Exclude the DEAD address from dividends using `dividendTracker.excludeFromDividends`.

**Resolution** RESOLVED

This is now excluded in the constructor.

**Issue #10****automatedMarketMakerPairs may get out of sync with uniswapV2Pair****Severity** LOW SEVERITY**Description**

Currently, the token owner needs to take care to manually call `setAutomatedMarketMakerPair` whenever they call `updateUniswapV2Router`. If they forget to do this, then the `automatedMarketMakerPairs` mapping will fail to contain the updated liquidity pair address.

**Recommendation**

Add a call to `_setAutomatedMarketMakerPair` from `updateUniswapV2Router`.

**Resolution** RESOLVED

As `updateUniswapV2Router` has been removed, this issue is no longer relevant.

**Issue #11****maxTxBPS is initially set below the minimum enforced value****Severity** LOW SEVERITY**Description**

When the contract is deployed, the antiwhale variable maxTxBPS is set to 49 (0.49%). However, in the setMaxTxBPS function that sets and enforces the bounds of this variable, the minimum value is 75 (0.75%). Users reading this function code may assume this value is the minimum the variable can be set to, when in fact it can be lower.

**Recommendation**

Consider setting the initial value of maxTxBPS to 75 to reduce potential confusion.

**Resolution** RESOLVED

setMaxTxBPS now has a minimum value of 0.49% to match the constructor.

**Issue #12****Unnecessary zero address checks in \_executeTransfer****Severity** INFORMATIONAL**Location**

Line 1579~  
require(sender != address(0), "Digits: transfer from the zero address");  
require(recipient != address(0), "Digits: transfer to the zero address");

**Description**

sender and recipient are already guaranteed to be non-zero by the calling function \_transfer.

**Recommendation**

Consider removing these checks.

**Resolution** RESOLVED

These checks have been removed.

**Issue #13****A number of variables are unused****Severity** INFORMATIONAL**Description**

Variables defined in a contract but not used within said contract could confuse third-party auditors. They furthermore increase the contract length and bytecode size for no reason:

- event BlacklistEnabled (never emitted)
- \_burn (private, not called)
- liquidityWallet (set but never read)

**Recommendation**

Consider removing the above variables to keep the contract short and simple.

**Resolution** RESOLVED

These variables have been removed.



**Issue #14****dividendTracker should be made immutable****Severity** INFORMATIONAL**Description**

Variables that are defined within the constructor but further remain unchanged should be marked as immutable to save gas and to ease the reviewing process of third-parties.

**Recommendation**

Consider marking this variable as immutable.

**Resolution** RESOLVED**Issue #15****\_name, \_symbol, dai and uniswapRouter can be made constant****Severity** INFORMATIONAL**Description**

Variables that are never modified can be indicated as such with the constant keyword. This is considered best practice since it makes the code more accessible for third-party reviewers and saves gas.

**Recommendation**

Consider making the above variables explicitly constant.

**Resolution** RESOLVED

## Severity

 INFORMATIONAL

## Description

Functions that are not used within the contract but only called externally can be indicated as such with the external keyword. This can in certain cases reduce gas and can ease the reviewing process of third parties:

- name
- symbol
- decimals
- allowance
- approve
- increaseAllowance
- decreaseAllowance
- transfer
- transferFrom
- setTokenStorage
- isExcludedFromFees
- excludeFromDividends
- isExcludedFromDividends
- setAutomatedMarketMakerPair
- updateUniswapV2Router
- claim
- compound
- withdrawableDividendOf
- withdrawnDividendOf
- accumulativeDividendOf
- getAccountInfo
- getLastClaimTime
- isExcludedFromMaxTx
- isExcludedFromMaxWallet
- blacklist
- removeFromBlacklist
- blacklistMany
- unBlacklistMany

## Recommendation

Consider marking the above functions as external.

## Resolution

 RESOLVED

**Issue #17****Lack of events for functions that change sensitive variables****Severity** INFORMATIONAL**Description**

Functions that affect the status of sensitive variables such as whitelists and fee percentages should emit events:

- setFee
- setTokenStorage
- updateDividendSettings
- setMaxTxBPS
- excludeFromMaxTx
- setMaxWalletBPS
- excludeFromMaxWallet
- blacklist
- removeFromBlacklist

**Recommendation**

Add events for the setter functions which modify sensitive state variables.

**Resolution** RESOLVED**Issue #18****A number of return values are not handled****Severity** INFORMATIONAL**Description**

The return values of the following function calls are not handled:

- uniswapV2Router.addLiquidity
- dividendTracker.processAccount
- dividendTracker.compoundAccount

**Recommendation**

Consider using variables to receive the return value of the above functions and handle both success and failure cases if needed by the business logic

**Resolution** RESOLVED

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## 2.2 TokenStorage

The token storage contract receives the taxable portion of Digits transfers and has functions for swapping these to DAI and adding Digits/DAI liquidity.

### 2.2.1 Privileged Roles

The following functions can be called only by the owner of the contract:

- `addManager`
- `removeManager`

The following functions can be called by authorized users ("managers", which can be set by the owner, but only to the address of the Digits token):

- `transferDai`
- `swapTokensForDai`
- `addLiquidity`
- `distributeDividends`
- `setLiquidityWallet`
- `updateUniswapV2Router`



## 2.2.2 Issues & Recommendations

<b>Issue #19</b>	<b>Gov Privilege: Owner can add any address as an authorized manager to withdraw funds or turn the Digits token into a honeypot</b>
<b>Severity</b>	 HIGH SEVERITY
<b>Description</b>	The owner can call addManager to authorize any address as a manager, including a user wallet or smart contract, which would then have the ability to perform a number of malicious actions that should only be performed by the Digits token, including: withdrawing DAI, updating the liquidity receiving wallet and updating the router.
<b>Recommendation</b>	Consider removing the managers mapping and only allowing the Digits token to be able to call these functions.
<b>Resolution</b>	 RESOLVED Only the tokenAddress (the Digits token) can be added as a manager.

<b>Issue #20</b>	<b>Gov Privilege: Owner can update token address, turning the Digits token into a honeypot</b>
<b>Severity</b>	 MEDIUM SEVERITY
<b>Description</b>	The owner can call setTokenAddress to update the tokenAddress used in swapping and liquidity adding, including to the zero address or a malicious contract that would revert calls, preventing sales.
<b>Recommendation</b>	Consider removing the setTokenAddress function. The token address is already set in the constructor, so if a new token is deployed, then a new TokenStorage contract can be deployed with it.
<b>Resolution</b>	 RESOLVED This function has been removed.

**Issue #21****LP tokens from addLiquidity are sent to liquidityWallet****Severity** MEDIUM SEVERITY**Location**

Line ~69  
uniswapV2Router.addLiquidity(  
    address(tokenAddress),  
    dai,  
    tokens,  
    dais,  
    0, // slippage unavoidable  
    0, // slippage unavoidable  
    liquidityWallet,  
    block.timestamp  
);

**Description**


The LP tokens provided from the addLiquidity call are sent to the liquidityWallet, who will be able to decompose the LPs and obtain the underlying tokens.

**Recommendation**

Consider setting the to address for the liquidity call to a burn address, ensuring that the received liquidity pool tokens are locked forever.

**Resolution** ACKNOWLEDGED

The team plans to lock the initial liquidity from this wallet with RugDoc, and will retain this generated liquidity in case it is needed later in the project's lifecycle.

**Issue #22****setLiquidityWallet and updateUniswapV2Router lack zero address checks****Severity** MEDIUM SEVERITY**Description**

The above functions lack zero address checks on \_liquidityWallet and newAddress respectively. Setting these to the zero address could cause Digits swaps to fail or turn the token into a honeypot.

**Recommendation**

Consider ensuring these addresses can not be set to the zero address.

**Resolution** RESOLVED

**Issue #23****success is unused in distributeDividends****Severity** INFORMATIONAL**Description**

Variables defined in a contract but not used within said contract could confuse third-party auditors. They also increase the contract length and bytecode size unnecessarily.

**Recommendation**

Consider removing the variable to keep the contract short and simple.

**Resolution** RESOLVED

The variable has been removed.

**Issue #24****dividendTracker should be made immutable****Severity** INFORMATIONAL**Description**

Variables that are defined within the constructor but further remain unchanged should be marked as immutable to save gas and to ease the reviewing process of third-parties.

**Recommendation**

Consider marking this variable as immutable.

**Resolution** RESOLVED**Issue #25****dai can be made constant****Severity** INFORMATIONAL**Description**

Variables that are never modified can be indicated as such with the constant keyword. This is considered best practice since it makes the code more accessible for third-party reviewers and saves gas.

**Recommendation**

Consider making the variable explicitly constant.

**Resolution** RESOLVED

**Issue #26****A number of variables can be made external****Severity** INFORMATIONAL**Description**

Functions that are not used within the contract but only called externally can be indicated as such with the `external` keyword. This can in certain cases reduce gas and can ease the reviewing process of third parties:

- `transferDai`
- `swapTokensForDai`
- `addLiquidity`
- `distributeDividends`
- `setLiquidityWallet`
- `updateUniswapV2Router`

**Recommendation**

Consider marking the above functions as external.

**Resolution** RESOLVED

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## 2.3 DividendTracker

DividendTracker receives DAI distributed to it from the TokenStorage contract and maintains the balances of token holding users. It is a non-transferrable ERC20 token, minted and burned depending on the Digits balance of the user. It is also responsible for the swapping logic to facilitate dividend compounding.

### 2.3.1 Privileged Roles

The following functions can be called only by the constructor of the contract (which is the Digits token):

- `renounceOwnership`
- `transferOwnership`
- `setBalance`
- `excludeFromDividends`
- `processAccount`
- `compoundAccount`



## 2.3.2 Issues & Recommendations

<b>Issue #27</b>	<b>Ambiguous error in distributeDividends</b>
<b>Severity</b>	 INFORMATIONAL
<b>Location</b>	<u>Line 52</u> <code>require(_totalSupply &gt; 0);</code>
<b>Description</b>	This statement does not revert with an error message, instead it reverts ambiguously, leaving users to potentially wonder what happened with their transaction. This also makes writing coverage tests difficult as the reversion method cannot be explicitly checked.
<b>Recommendation</b>	Consider adding an explicit reversion message to the above location.
<b>Resolution</b>	 RESOLVED

<b>Issue #28</b>	<b>tokenAddress should be made immutable</b>
<b>Severity</b>	 INFORMATIONAL
<b>Description</b>	Variables that are defined within the constructor but further remain unchanged should be marked as immutable to save gas and to ease the reviewing process of third-parties.
<b>Recommendation</b>	Consider marking this variable as <code>immutable</code> .
<b>Resolution</b>	 RESOLVED



**Issue #29****dai, \_name and \_symbol can be made constant****Severity** INFORMATIONAL**Description**

Variables that are never modified can be indicated as such with the constant keyword. This is considered best practice since it makes the code more accessible for third-party reviewers and saves gas.

**Recommendation**

Consider making the above variables as explicitly constant.

**Resolution** RESOLVED**Issue #30****A number of variables can be made external****Severity** INFORMATIONAL**Description**

Functions that are not used within the contract but only called externally can be indicated as such with the external keyword. This can in certain cases reduce gas and can ease the reviewing process of third parties:

- distributeDividends
- isExcludedFromDividends
- processAccount
- compoundAccount
- withdrawnDividendOf
- getAccountInfo
- getLastClaimTime
- name
- symbol
- decimals
- updateUniswapV2Router

**Recommendation**

Consider marking the above functions as external.

**Resolution** RESOLVED



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